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Abstract—The Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast
(ADS-B) system is a key component of the Next Generation Air
Transportation System (NextGen) that manages the increasingly
congested airspace. It provides accurate aircraft localization
and efficient air traffic management and also improves the
safety of billions of current and future passengers. While the
benefits of ADS-B are well known, the lack of basic security
measures like encryption and authentication introduces various
exploitable security vulnerabilities. One practical threat is the
ADS-B spoofing attack that targets the ADS-B ground station, in
which the ground-based or aircraft-based attacker manipulates
the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) address (a
unique identifier for each aircraft) in the ADS-B messages to
fake the appearance of non-existent aircraft or masquerade as a
trusted aircraft. As a result, this attack can confuse the pilots or
the air traffic control personnel and cause dangerous maneuvers.
In this paper, we introduce SODA – a two-stage Deep Neural
Network (DNN)-based spoofing detector for ADS-B that consists
of a message classifier and an aircraft classifier. It allows a ground
station to examine each incoming message based on the PHY-
layer features (e.g., IQ samples and phases) and flag suspicious
messages. Our experimental results show that SODA detects
ground-based spoofing attacks with a probability of 99.34%,
while having a very small false alarm rate (i.e., 0.43%). It
outperforms other machine learning techniques such as XGBoost,
Logistic Regression, and Support Vector Machine. It further
identifies individual aircraft with an average F-score of 96.68%
and an accuracy of 96.66%, with a significant improvement over
the state-of-the-art detector.
Index Terms—Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast,
Deep Neural Network, Spoofing Attack, Wireless Security
I. INTRODUCTION
Rapid growth in the air traffic expected for the coming
years requires innovative applications and methodologies to
guarantee efficiency of the transportation infrastructure and the
safety for passengers and crew. In order to monitor and manage
the increasingly congested airspace, the Automatic Dependent
Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) system is deployed as a key
component of the Next Generation Air Transportation System
[1]. The airborne ADS-B OUT devices (transmitters) allow air-
craft to periodically broadcast their identifications and current
positions, determined from global navigation satellite systems,
to ground stations or other aircraft over the 1090 MHz band.
All aircraft will need to be equipped with ADS-B capabilities
to be operated in the European and U.S. airspace by 2020, as
per the EASA and FAA1 regulations.
1EASA and FAA stand for the European Aviation Safety Agency and the
Federal Aviation Administration, respectively.
Despite of the advantages of ADS-B, its security vulnerabil-
ities have been widely acknowledged [2]–[6]. In particular, the
source of the problem is the lack of basic security mechanisms,
such as encryption and authentication. As a result, a variety of
wireless attacks can be launched against the ADS-B system,
such as eavesdropping, jamming, message injection (spoofing),
message deletion, and message modification, as summarized
in [3]. The above security vulnerabilities of ADS-B are further
exacerbated by the prevalence of low-cost Software Defined
Radios (SDRs) (e.g., USRP [7]). It has been demonstrated in
[5], [6] that the above attacks are easy and practically feasible
to launch for a moderately sophisticated attacker with a SDR.
In this work, we focus on the ADS-B message injection or
spoofing attacks that target a ground station. As illustrated in
Fig. 1, the ADS-B receiver receives broadcast messages broad-
cast by aircraft within signal range and feeds them to the Air
Traffic Control (ATC) system. We classify the ADS-B spoofing
attacks into two categories: ground-based and aircraft-based.
In the first attack, the ground-based attacker uses a SDR to
retransmit previously recorded messages or transmit newly
generated and correctly modulated fake messages, which are
referred to as the replay attack and the ghost aircraft injection
attack, respectively. The main objective is to fake the presence
of non-existent (ghost) aircraft and confuse the ATC system. In
the second attack, an aircraft-based attacker modifies the ICAO
address in the ADS-B messages transmitted by the airborne
ADS-B transponder, masquerading itself as a known or trusted
aircraft to bypass the surveillance.
Use of cryptographic primitives (e.g., Message Authenti-
cation Code) is one way to defend against ADS-B spoofing
[8]–[12], but it requires protocol modifications or overheads
and shifts the problems to the design of secure and scalable
key management and distribution schemes. Alternative non-
cryptographic approaches aim to identify and exploit unique
characteristics of ADS-B transponders for fingerprinting. In
[13], Strohmeier et al. analyzed message transmission patterns
(inter-arrival time distribution) and identified distinct patterns
between commercial ADS-B transponder types and their im-
plementations. Nevertheless, an attacker with a SDR-based
spoofer has the full control of inter-transmission times and can
mimic the transmission pattern to evade detection. A malicious
aircraft can also masquerade as another aircraft equipped with
an ADS-B transponder of a similar implementation (e.g., from
the same manufacturer) to avoid detection. In [14], Leonardi
et al. proposed to fingerprint aircraft through phase patterns
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Fig. 1. Illustration of ADS-B message injection or spoofing attacks that target the ground station. The ground-based attacker uses a SDR device to replay
previously recorded ADS-B messages or transmit newly generated and correctly modulated fake ADS-B messages, whereas an aircraft-based attacker modifies
the ICAO address of transmitted messages and masquerades as a known or trusted aircraft. SODA is deployed between the ADS-B receiver and the ATC
system and flags suspicious messages based on the PHY-layer features using DNN.
and applied neural networks for multi-class classification. Due
to the limited number of predefined classes for phase patterns
(seven in total), there will be a significant number of aircraft
in each class (e.g., 100+ aircraft in the class of non-coherent
phase patterns), leaving a lot of freedom to the attacker.
In this work, we present SODA – a Deep Neural Network
(DNN)-based spoofing detector for ADS-B. SODA takes PHY-
layer features (e.g., IQ samples and phases) as input and
performs two-stage detection to detect malicious messages and
identify malicious aircraft.
Contributions. Throughout this paper, we make the following
contributions:
• We introduce SODA, a DNN-based detector that consists
of a message classifier and an aircraft classifier to detect
the ground-based and aircraft-based spoofing attacks.
• We build a SDR-based spoofer and conduct Over-The-Air
(OTA) experiments in an anechoic chamber to emulate
realistic ground-based spoofing attacks. Our experimental
results show that the message classifier detects malicious
messages from a ground-based attacker with a detection
probability of 99.34% and a negligible false alarm rate
(i.e., 0.43%). It outperforms baseline machine learning
techniques including XGBoost, Logistic Regression, and
Support Vector Machine.
• We build an aircraft classifier that performs multi-class
classification with each aircraft being its own class.
Our experimental results show that a fine-tuned aircraft
classifier classifies a total of 238 aircraft with an average
F-score of 96.68% and an accuracy of 96.66%, with a
significant performance improvement over the state-of-
the-art detector in [14].
Organization. The remainder of this paper is organized as fol-
lows. Section II reviews related work and Section III provides
relevant background on ADS-B and DNN. In Section IV, we
describe our system and adversary models. Section V presents
the proposed detection system, and Section VI presents the ex-
perimental evaluation. This study is concluded in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
The security vulnerabilities of ADS-B have been analyzed in
many studies [2]–[6]. One way to secure wireless ADS-B com-
munication is through cryptographic measures [8]–[12]. Finke
et al. compared various encryption schemes and supported a
symmetric cipher using the FFX algorithm [9]. Nevertheless, it
is acknowledged as a challenging task to perform secure key
management and distribution. More recently, Wesson et al.
proposed the use Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and ECDSA
(Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm) signatures as the
cryptographic solution. In [12], Feng et al. presented a PKI
solution for ADS-B message authentication based on Elliptic
Curve Cipher and X.509 certificates. But the proposed scheme
would require additional messages to carry the signature and
timestamps, which is hardly scalable in practice, and efficient
certification distribution remains an open question.
Alternative non-cryptographic approaches can be deployed
to mitigate the attacks on the ADS-B system. In [15], the
authors evaluated ADS-B jamming attacks and proposed a
solution based on PHY-layer signal separation. In [16], Scha¨fer
et al. proposed secure track verification based on timing. In
[17], Ghose and Lazos exploited the Doppler spread phe-
nomenon to estimate actual velocities and crossed them with
the claimed velocities. In [18], Scha¨fer et al. exploited the
Doppler shift measurements from multiple ground stations
(verifiers) to verify the motion of the aircraft (prover). While
it was implicitly assumed that an attacker could modify the
transmission frequency to mimic the Doppler shift and deceive
a single ground station, we show that it could be a challenging
task for the attacker, if the detector leverages the PHY-layer
features for detection as SODA does. In [19], the authors
proposed an enhanced ADS-B protocol called ADS-BT, which
embeds transmit timestamps in the ADS-B messages, but such
approach would require protocol modifications.
In the more recent study in [14], the authors identified
7 classes of phase patterns and exploited them for aircraft
classification. They applied a neural network (one hidden layer
with 10 nodes) and reported an accuracy of 91.4% for the 7-
class classification task. While the results are promising, the
effectiveness of the proposed detector is limited by the number
of classes. In other words, more aircraft in one class imply the
greater freedom for an attacker to launch the aircraft spoofing
attack. In the ideal case, there should be only a single aircraft
in each class. Moreover, a ground-based attacker in possession
of a SDR-based spoofer can also mimic the phase pattern to
evade the detection.
In this work, we develop SODA – a DNN-based two-stage
spoofing detector. In the first stage, the message classifier
examines each incoming message and labels it as malicious
or non-malicious. For those that are considered non-malicious
in the first stage, they are further processed by the aircraft
classifier, which predicts the ICAO address based on the PHY-
layer features and compares the prediction against the claimed
address to detect aircraft spoofing attacks. Our experimental
results demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed SODA
with a detection probability of 99.34% in the first stage and
an accuracy of 96.66% for a total of 238 aircraft (with each
aircraft being its own class) in the second stage.
III. BACKGROUND
In this section, we provide relevant background on the ADS-
B protocol (Section III-A) and a brief introduction to DNN
(Section III-B).
A. ADS-B Background
Aircraft use the ADS-B technology to periodically transmit
their identifications (ICAO addresses) and status data (e.g.
position, speed, heading, etc.) to ground stations and nearby
aircraft. There are two types of ADS-B devices: 1) ADS-B
OUT devices for transmitting broadcasts to ADS-B receivers,
and 2) ADS-B IN devices for receiving broadcasts, weather
data, and ATC reports. The data link standards for ADS-B
are the 987 MHz Universal Access Transceiver (UAT) and
the 1090 MHz Extended Squitter (1090ES). The former was
created specifically for aviation services such as ADS-B and
requires new hardware, whereas the later integrates the ADS-
B function to traditional Mode S transponders. In this work,
we focus on the commercially used 1090ES data link.
Fig. 2 illustrates the ADS-B message structure. Each mes-
sage contains a 8 µs preamble for synchronization and a 56-bit
(short) or 112-bit (extended) data block. The first 5 bits of the
data block contain the downlink format (the message type).
The subsequent 3-bit capability field serves as an additional
identifier. The 24-bit ICAO address is a unique identifier issued
to each aircraft by the ICAO. The 56-bit extended ADS-B data
field contains surveillance information such as identification,
position, velocity, and emergency codes. The last field is a
24-bit parity check for receivers to validate the correctness of
Fig. 2. Illustration of ADS-B message structure. Each message consists of a
8 µs preamble and a 56 µs or 112 µs data block.
the preceding message. Within the 56-bit data field, the first
5 bits represent the Type Code (TC), indicating the type of
information contained in the subsequent bits. While there are
a total of 31 TCs, we focus on messages that include airborne
position data with barometric altitude (TCs 9-18), and airborne
velocities (TC 19).
ADS-B messages are transmitted every 0.5 s on average
using the Pulse Position Modulation (PPM) scheme. Since the
data rate is 1 Mbps, the total duration is 120 µs for an extended
ADS-B message (including the preamble).
B. Deep Neural Network
DNN is a widely used supervised learning technique, which
requires a large amount of labeled training data. It consists
of input, hidden, and output layers. Each layer consists of a
certain amount of nodes (neurons). The number of input nodes
is equal to the number of features of a sample, and the number
of output nodes usually correspond to the number of labels or
classes. The number of hidden layers and nodes are considered
as tuneable hyper-parameters.
In a feed-forward DNN with multiple hidden layers, with
j hidden nodes, each node maps its input, xj , to the output
state yj , through an activation function. In Eq. (1), xj is equal
to bj , the bias of node j, plus the sum of yiwij , over all i
nodes in the preceding layer, where yi is the output state of
node i in the previous layer, and wij is the connecting weight
from node i to node j. The sigmoid function is often used
in binary classification models, whereas the softmax function
is used for multi-class classification problems, and returns the
probability of each class, pj , over k total classes.
xj = bj +
∑
i
yiwij . (1)
A cost function (e.g., cross entropy) is defined to measure
the discrepancy between the target outputs and the actual out-
puts produced for each training sample. The derivatives of the
cost function are then back-propagated throughout the network
to update the weights, thus training the DNN classifier. In order
to increase the efficiency of back-propagation on large training
sets, mini-batches, i.e., small random set of training cases, are
used in place of the entire training data. The term epoch refers
to a single forward and back-propagation of the training data.
More details on DNN are available in literature such as [20].
IV. SYSTEM AND ADVERSARY MODEL
In this section, we present our system model (Section IV-A)
and our adversary model (Section IV-B) for ADS-B spoofing
attacks against a ground station.
A. System Model
We consider a ground station equipped with an ADS-B
receiver that has access to the raw IQ data. We assume that the
ground station has sufficient resources (e.g., processing power
or storage) for various machine learning tasks. We also assume
that the ground station has a database of previously received
authentic ADS-B messages (including both message contents
and IQ data) for each aircraft, which can be used to train a
supervised learning-based detector. In practice, such a database
may be created by a ground station equipped with secondary
surveillance systems (e.g., the radar surveillance system) such
that the authenticity of each message can be cross-validated.
This database can be later shared among other ground stations.
Attack messages can be collected by emulating the spoofing
attacks using various SDR-based spoofers. While a database
created by a single ground station tends to be regional and does
not cover all aircraft, multiple ground stations can collaborate
and build a nation-wide dataset offline.
B. Adversary Model
As illustrated in Fig. 1, we consider two types of attackers:
1) a ground-based attacker that uses a low-cost SDR-based
spoofer, and 2) an aircraft-based attacker that uses its ADS-B
transponder with modified ICAO address. While it is possible
for an onboard attacker to transmit spoofed messages with the
SDR-based spoofer from the aircraft, the signal may not reach
the ground station due to the low transmit power of SDRs. For
example, the output power of USRP B210/B200 is +20 dBm
(100 mW) max [7], whereas airborne ADS-B transponders are
required to have a minimum transmission power of 75 W for
smaller aircraft and 125 W or 200 W for larger aircraft [21].
Spoofing attacks launched by an on-board attacker against the
aircraft is beyond the scope of this paper.
We assume that attackers have full knowledge of the ADS-B
protocol and the location of the targeted ground station. Since
SDR devices are highly flexible and configurable through soft-
ware, the attacker will have control over signal characteristics
(e.g., power level, phase, transmitting frequency). In particular,
we assume that the attacker is aware of the Doppler effect
(caused by aircraft movements) and mimic the Doppler shift
by shifting the transmitting frequency of the generated signal
(or equivalently, by modifying the phases of the transmitted IQ
samples). In contrast, commercial ADS-B OUT devices have
custom circuits and do not provide the flexibility for users to
access its physical layer or modify the signal characteristics.
Depending on the way the spoofed messages are generated,
we further divide the ADS-B spoofing attacks into three types:
1) message or IQ data replay attack, 2) ghost aircraft injection
attack, and 3) aircraft spoofing attack. The first two attacks can
only be launched by a ground-based attacker, while the last one
is launched by an aircraft-based attacker. Here we consider the
replay attack as a special case of the spoofing attack, in which
the attacker transmits previously recorded messages pretending
to be the legitimate aircraft, without bothering to manipulate
the message contents. We now describe each attack in detail.
Message or IQ data replay attack. In this attack, the ground-
based attacker records the messages contents or the IQ data of
the received authentic ADS-B messages using the SDR device,
and then transmits the same messages at a later time without
changing the message contents. Compared to the message
replay attack, the IQ data replay attack is much stealthier, as
the recorded IQ data incorporates a lot of information about
the Doppler effect, the transmitter characteristics (e.g., carrier
frequency offset), and the channel characteristics (e.g., multi-
path and fading effects), which is difficult to mimic otherwise.
Ghost aircraft injection attack. Unlike the replay attacks,
the ground-based attacker transmits fake ADS-B messages
with arbitrary contents of its choice using the SDR device.
In particular, the attacker can simulate the trajectories of non-
existent aircraft and generate corresponding ADS-B messages
with carefully chosen Doppler shifts, causing ghost aircrafts
to appear on the console of the ground station.
Aircraft spoofing attack. In this attack, an aircraft-based at-
tacker (malicious aircraft) attempts to masquerade as a known
or trusted aircraft by spoofing the ICAO address and hide
its true identity. Since the aircraft is physically present, the
masquerading attack will not be detected even if the secondary
radar surveillance system is deployed.
V. PROPOSED SYSTEM – SODA
In this section, we first describe the architecture of SODA
(Section V-A). We then present the DNN-based message
classifier (Section V-B) and aircraft classifier (Section V-C).
A. System Architecture
Fig. 3 illustrates the architecture of SODA, which consists
of a message classifier and an aircraft classifier. The message
classifier decides whether the message is malicious or not. If
a message is considered non-malicious, it means that it is not
transmitted by the SDR-based spoofer, but it may come from a
malicious aircraft instead of the legitimate transmitter as indi-
cated by the ICAO address in the message. Hence, the aircraft
classifier aims to further determine the transmitting aircraft of
the message and compare the output ICAO address against the
claimed ICAO address to detect the aircraft spoofing attack.
Since both message and aircraft classifiers are based on
DNN, they need to be trained on a large labeled dataset. At
runtime, the SODA takes each incoming ADS-B message (IQ
data) as input and decides whether this message is suspicious
or not. Since the SODA is a passive detection system that only
flags possibly spoofed messages, it is up to the ATC system to
take further actions (e.g., drop the flagged messages or display
the ghost aircraft on the console). In the rest of this section,
we describe the two stages in more detail.
B. Message Classification
Message classification is considered as a binary classifi-
cation problem. In SODA, the raw IQ samples are used as
features. Since each message lasts 120 µs, a sampling rate of
R MHz will produce 240R interleaving IQ samples.
Data collection. To successfully train the message classifier, a
large amount of realistic ground-based spoofing attack data is
needed. As illustrated in Fig. 4(a), we constructed an ADS-B
Fig. 3. Illustration of SODA Architecture. The message classifier determines
whether the ADS-B message is malicious or not so as to detect ground-based
spoofing attacks. A non-malicious message will be further passed into the
aircraft classifer. By comparing the output ICAO address with the claimed
ICAO address, the detector can detect the aircraft-based spoofing attack.
ADS-B Antenna
Laptop + RTL-
SDR dongle + 
1090 MHz filter
Laptop + USRP + 
ADS-B Antenna
ADS-B Receiver
(Ground station)
(a) (b)
ADS-B Transmitter
(Ground attaacker)
Fig. 4. Illustration of data collection using the constructed ADS-B receiver
and SDR-based spoofer. (a) The ADS-B receiver collects authentic messages
in an open area at the coordinates of (47.6534,−122.3076). (b) The same
ADS-B receiver receives malicious messages transmitted by the SDR-based
spoofer in an anechoic chamber.
receiver (the ground station) that consists of a laptop, a RTL-
SDR dongle [22], a 1090 MHz bandpass filter, and an ADS-B
antenna to collect real ADS-B messages in an open area. We
then built a SDR-based ADS-B spoofer consisting of a USRP
B210 [7] and a 5-dBi 1090 MHz antenna (Fig. 4(b)) to emulate
ADS-B spoofing attacks.
For the message replay attack, the spoofer transmits cor-
rectly modulated ADS-B signals using the message contents
decoded from authentic ADS-B messages. For the IQ data
replay attack, the spoofer simply replays the IQ data of the
recorded ADS-B messages. This represents the worst-case IQ
data replay attack, because the replayed IQ data directly comes
from the ground station, while in practice the attacker would
record the IQ data using different hardware at a different
location. In the ghost aircraft injection attack, a number of
aircraft are simulated with random ICAO addresses, velocities,
altitudes, and headings. For simplicity, we assume that each
aircraft broadcasts an ADS-B message every second.
In order to simulate different received signal strengths of
messages from the same aircraft when it is approaching or
flying away from the receiver, attack messages are transmitted
multiple times with different USRP gains. Since the attacker
may be aware of the Doppler effect and the existence of carrier
frequency offsets, the calculated or random Doppler shifts and
frequency offsets are incorporated into the transmitted attack
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Fig. 5. Examples of IQ samples of received ADS-B messages under different
ground-based ADS-B spoofing attacks. (a) No attack (authentic message). (b)
Message replay attack. (c) IQ data replay attack. (d) Ghost aircraft injection
attack.
messages. More details are provided in Section VI.
Message classification example. Fig. 5 illustrates authentic
and malicious messages under different attacks. Recall that
both message and IQ data replay attacks reuse the original
message contents, whereas the ghost aircraft injection attack
generates fake message contents. Comparing Fig. 5(b) with
Fig. 5(a), we notice that despite of the same message contents,
the message replay attack leads to very different IQ samples.
In contrast, the IQ data replay attack (Fig. 5(c)) can produce
a very similar but shifted phase pattern, as compared to the
original message (Fig. 5(a)).
C. Aircraft Classification
The aircraft classifier predicts the source ICAO address
of the received ADS-B message and compares it against
the claimed ICAO address. Since there are many aircraft
that transmit ADS-B messages, it then becomes a multi-class
classification problem. It is worth noting that through aircraft
classification, the SODA can not only detect the aircraft
spoofing attack, but also identify the masquerading aircraft.
Features. Unlike message classification, the aircraft classifier
does not use IQ samples or their magnitudes that encode the
(possibly spoofed) ICAO address as features in order to avoid
being deceived. Instead, it uses the phases that are independent
of the claimed ICAO address as features. The phase of the k-th
pair of IQ samples is computed as
φ[k] = tan−1
(
xq[k]
xi[k]
)
.
From the communication theory [23], we know that the phases
encode the information about the TX and RX carrier frequency
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Fig. 6. Comparison of message phase patterns of different aircraft.
offsets and the Doppler shift. To see why, denote the passband
ADS-B signal as
xp(t) = Re
{√
2x(t)ej2pifct
}
,
where x(t) = xi(t) + jxq(t) is the complex baseband signal
and fc is the carrier frequency (1090 MHz for ADS-B signals).
With a carrier frequency offset of ∆f and a phase offset ∆φ,
the resulting signal becomes
x˜p(t) = Re
{√
2x(t)ej2pi(fc+∆f)t+∆φ
}
= Re
{√
2
(
x(t)ejφ(t)
)
ej2pifct
}
,
where φ(t) = 2pi∆ft+ ∆φ. Hence, the rate of the change in
the phase indicates the carrier frequency offset, which is a sum
of TX/RX frequency offsets and the Doppler shift2 and also
affected by the propagation channel. As a result, the phases
encode rich information and thus can be used as features for
classification.
Aircraft classification example. A comparison of phase pat-
terns of received messages from different aircraft is provided
in Fig. 6. On one hand, we observe that aircraft could have
distinguishable phase patterns from each other, which could
be learned by the DNN-based aircraft classifier. On the other
hand, it is possible for two aircraft to have a similar phase
pattern, such as Aircraft 7 and 8, which might cause potential
misclassifications.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section, we describe the procedure for data collection
and then evaluate the performance of both message and aircraft
2Since the ADS-B signal is a narrowband signal, the impact of the Doppler
effect is equivalent to shifting the carrier frequency by a certain amount.
TABLE I
COLLECTED DATASETS FOR MESSAGE CLASSIFICATION.
Dataset Label Wired OTA Total
Authentic messages A0 N/A 18675 18675
Message replay attack A1 8101 8318 16419
IQ data replay attack A2 5961 5806 11767
Ghost aircraft injection attack A3 8770 8832 17602
TABLE II
BASIC DNN SETUP FOR SODA
Description Value
Input Layer Number of features
Output Layer Number of classes
Weight Initialization Xavier normal
Weight Regularizer L2
Activation Function ReLU
Output Activation Function Softmax
Cost Function Cross entropy
Optimizer Adam
Epochs, Batch Size 50, 32
classifiers of SODA implemented using Keras [24] using real-
world datasets.
A. Datasets
The ADS-B receiver and SDR-based spoofer in Fig. 4 were
used for data collection. The ADS-B antenna was mounted on
a tripod and the overall height is about 1.5 meters. A modified
version of dump1090 [25] was used to collect IQ samples with
a gain of 49.6 and a sampling rate of 2 MHz. Both wired and
OTA experiments were performed to collect realistic spoofing
attack data. The former were conducted by directly wiring
the transmitter and receiver. The latter were performed in an
anechoic chamber located in the basement level of a building
to avoid possible signal emission.
Datasets for message classification. Table I summarizes the
collected datasets. A total of 18675 authentic ADS-B messages
(extended, downlink format of 17) were collected in an open
area within half an hour. The first 10000 messages were used
for message and IQ data replay attacks. A total of 20 ghost
aircraft were simulated with a velocity randomly drawn from a
normal distribution N(230 m/s, 10 m/s). The altitude follows
N(9000 m, 500 m). The headings (in degree) are drawn from
a uniform distribution U [0, 360).
The Doppler shift ∆fd and the carrier frequency offset ∆fc
are simulated in four different cases: i) ∆fd = ∆fc = 0, ii)
calculated ∆fd and ∆fc = 0, iii) calculated ∆fd and random
∆fc, iv) random ∆fd and ∆fc = 0, and v) random ∆fd and
random ∆fc. The distributions of random ∆fd and ∆fd are
U [−1 kHz,+1 kHz] and U [−10 kHz,+10 kHz], respectively.
Datasets for aircraft classification. In order to provide suf-
ficient amount of data for aircraft classification, we collected
additional data using the constructed ADS-B receiver on the
rooftop of a building for two consecutive days. There are a
total of 300,152 and 326,122 extended ADS-B messages from
157 and 210 aircraft in two days, respectively.
TABLE III
COMPARISON OF DIFFERENT MODELS FOR MESSAGE CLASSIFICATION
Model Pd Pfa
D1 99.39% 2.60%
D2 99.50% 2.09%
D3 99.34% 0.43%
XGBoost 78.37% 5.17%
LR 54.83% 46.93%
SVM 51.52% 43.64%
B. Performance of Message Classification
In this experiment, we evaluate the performance of the
DNN-based message classifier and compare it against three
baseline classifiers: XGBoost [26], Logistic Regression (LR)
[27], and Support Vector Machine (SVM) [28].
Setup. We first consider all attacks and split the dataset into
60%, 20%, and 20% for training, validation, and testing,
respectively. The DNN parameters are summarized in Table II.
We consider the following three DNN models:
1) D1: one hidden layer with 128 nodes,
2) D2: one hidden layer with 256 nodes, and
3) D3: two hidden layers with 128 nodes per layer.
When training XGBoost/LR/SVM, the attack dataset is sub-
sampled so that the attack and authentic datasets have the same
number of messages, avoiding data imbalance.
Metrics. Since each classifier acts as a detector, we adopt the
following two metrics:
1) Detection probability (denoted as Pd): the percentage of
malicious messages classified as malicious, and
2) False alarm probability (denoted as Pfa): the percentage
of authentic messages classified as malicious.
In practice, a classifier that achieves a higher Pd and a lower
Pfa (that is within a given limit) is preferred.
Results. The results are provided in Table III. We first observe
that a simple DNN model such as D1 can already achieve very
good performance with Pd = 99.39% and Pfa = 2.60%, as
compared to other machine learning techniques. In particular,
LR and SVM do not perform well in this task, and XGBoost
only achieves Pd of 78.37% with Pfa = 5.17%. If we increase
the complexity of the DNN model by doubling the number of
nodes, the message classifier (D2) achieves Pd = 99.50% and
Pfa = 2.09%. Interestingly, if the hidden nodes of D2 are split
equally into two hidden layers, the resulting classifier (D3) can
further reduce Pfa to 0.43%, while keeping Pd = 99.34%.
Impact of attack dataset diversity. As shown in the previous
experiment, the DNN model performs well when trained with
all attack datasets. Then a natural question is that if the DNN
model is trained on a subset of attack datasets, will it achieve
good performance when tested with unknown attacks? In this
experiment, we study the impact of attack dataset diversity on
D3, and the results are provided in Table IV.
As we can see, the performance of DNN depends on the
attack datasets used for training. An interesting observation
that when trained with A1, the classifier detects A3 with Pd =
96.31%. In contrast, when trained with A3, the classifier only
detects A1 with Pd = 21.80%. In general, the model does
TABLE IV
DETECTION PERFORMANCE OF D3 MESSAGE CLASSIFIER WHEN TRAINED
WITH DIFFERENT COMBINATIONS OF ATTACK DATASETS
Attack datasets
used for training Pd of A1 Pd of A2 Pd of A3 Pfa
{A1} 99.67% 11.68% 96.31% 0.35%
{A2} 38.57% 99.07% 55.21% 0.40%
{A3} 21.80% 0.30% 100.00% 0.03%
{A1, A2} 99.03% 98.85% 96.28% 0.59%
{A1, A3} 99.88% 13.59% 100.0% 0.70%
{A2, A3} 72.91% 98.94% 99.97% 0.27%
{A1, A2, A3} 99.36% 98.34% 100.00% 0.43%
not generalize to unknown attacks, suggesting the necessity
of creating a diverse attack dataset for message classification.
C. Performance of Aircraft Classification
In this section, we evaluate the DNN-based aircraft classi-
fier. We then study the impact of the size of the training set
and the number of aircraft on the classification performance.
Setup. We split the data into three portions: 60% for training,
20% for validation, and 20% for testing. We post-processed
the collected data and obtained a dataset that consists of
238 aircraft with 1000 messages for each aircraft, totalling
238,000 messages. Each message has a total of 240 phase
values (features) computed from the IQ samples. Since DNN
dominates other machine learning techniques (Section VI-B),
we focus on DNN in this experiment. Specifically, we consider
five DNN models with various complexity:
1) M1: one hidden layer with 512 nodes,
2) M2: one advanced hidden layer with 1024 nodes,
3) M3: two hidden layers with 512 nodes per layer, and
4) M4: three hidden layers with 512 nodes per layer.
5) M5: a fine-tuned model with two hidden layers (512 and
256 nodes), batch normalization [29] and 200 epochs.
The parameters in Table II are used for constructing DNNs.
Metrics. We adopt the following standard metrics for multi-
class classification: precision, recall, and F-score [30]. Let TPi
be the true positive rate at which Aircraft i’s messages are
correctly identified from Aircraft i. Similarly, the false positive
rate FPRi and the false negative rate FNRi are the rates of
incorrectly accepted and incorrectly rejected identifications for
Aircraft i, respectively. Hence, we have
Precision: Pri =
TPRi
TPRi + FPRi
,
Recall: Rei =
TPRi
TPRi + FNRi
,
F-Score: F-Scorei =
2× Pri × Rei
Pri + Rei
.
Note that high precision and high recall imply low FPR and
low FNR, respectively.
To further quantify the overall performance of the classifier,
we compute the macro-averaging precision (AvgPr) and recall
(AvgRe) by averaging the Pri’s and Rei’s over all aircraft, and
the average F-score as
AvgF-Score =
2× AvgPr× AvgRe
AvgPr + AvgRe
.
TABLE V
PERFORMANCE OF DNN-BASED AIRCRAFT CLASSIFIERS
Model AvgPr AvgRe AvgF-Score Accuracy
M1 93.69% 93.60% 93.64% 93.60%
M2 94.62% 94.51% 94.57% 94.51%
M3 94.88% 94.68% 94.78% 94.68%
M4 94.52% 94.28% 94.40% 94.28%
M5 96.69% 96.66% 96.68% 96.66%
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Fig. 7. Empirical CDF of F-scores of DNN-based aircraft classifiers.
In addition, the accuracy metric is often used to measure the
overall effectiveness of a classifier, defined as the percentage
of messages that are correctly classified.
Results. The results are provided in Table V. Compared to M1
that achieves an average F-score of 93.64% and an accuracy
of 93.60%, increasing the model complexity by adding more
nodes or one more layer (e.g., M2 and M3) improves the
overall performance. Keeping adding more layers (e.g., M4)
does not necessarily result in performance gain. But with
careful tuning of hyper-parameters and longer training time, a
fine-tuned model like M5 can achieve an average F-score of
96.68% and an accuracy of 96.66%.
Fig. 7 plots the empirical cumulative distribution function
(CDF) of the F-scores. We can see that over 50% of aircraft
have a F-score of 95%+ for all models. In addition, increasing
model complexity tends to improve the F-score of individual
aircraft. For example, there are 23.53% of aircraft with a F-
score lower than 90% with M1, and this ratio drops to 15.97%
and 13.87% with M3 and M4, respectively. For the fine-tuned
model, this ratio is as low as 2.5%.
Fig. 8 plots the confusion matrix of M5, in which the (i, j)-
th entry represents the probability of Aircraft i’s messages
incorrectly classified as Aircraft j’s. With 96.66% messages
correctly identified, there exist only 33 non-diagonal entries
(out of 56644) with a rate larger than or equal to 2% (4
misclassified messages). The largest misclassification rate is
8.0% between Aircraft 91 and 92, suggesting similarity in their
phase patterns.
Impact of the size of the training set. In order to understand
how the size of the training set affects the DNN performance,
we vary the training ratio from 0.2 to 1.0 with a step of
0.1 and plot the average F-score and accuracy of M3. As
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Fig. 8. Normalized confusion matrix of the fine-tuned aircraft classifier (M5).
There are 33 non-diagonal entries larger than or equal to 0.02 (blue squares).
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Fig. 9. Performance of the aircraft classifier (M3) in terms of average F-score
and accuracy as a function of the training ratio. The performance improves
with more training samples and tends to saturate after a certain point.
shown in Fig. 9, with only 20% of the original training set
(i.e., 120 messages per aircraft), the classifier achieves an
accuracy of over 80%. While the overall performance increases
as the training ratio increases, the performance gain of more
training samples tends to gradually decrease. Similar trends
are observed with other models and thus not reported due to
the space limit.
Impact of the number of aircraft. In this experiment, we
vary the number of aircraft from 25 to 238 with a step of
25 and plot the performance of M3, as shown in Fig. 10.
With only 25 aircraft, the classification accuracy is as high as
98.06%. With more aircraft, the performance drops and comes
to a level of around 95%.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we proposed SODA to detect ADS-B spoofing
attacks using DNN, which consists of a message classifier and
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Fig. 10. Performance of the aircraft classifier (M3) in terms of average F-
score and accuracy as a function of the number of aircraft (classes). When the
number of aircraft increases, the performance slightly drops to around 95%.
an aircraft classifier. The message classifier takes IQ samples
as input and detects malicious messages from the SDR-based
ground attacker, including the message/IQ data replay attack
and the ghost aircraft injection attack. The aircraft classifier
takes the phases of received messages as input and detects
spoofed messages by comparing the claimed ICAO address
against the predicted ICAO address. We collected real-world
ADS-B messages and generated realistic attack data using
our ADS-B testbed through OTA experiments in an anechoic
chamber. Our experimental results show that the SODA detects
ground-based spoofing attacks with a detection probability of
99.34% and a false alarm probability of 0.43%. It detects
aircraft spoofing attacks with an average F-score of 96.68%
and an accuracy of 96.66%.
As future work, we will study the scalability of SODA
and explore the use of clustering to identify aircraft with
similar features and detect ADS-B spoofing attacks launched
by aircraft in different clusters. We will also perform post-
processing of the IQ samples to extract more stable features
(e.g., frequency offsets) to improve the robustness of SODA
against various factors, including radio propagation, receiver
characteristics, and measurement noise.
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